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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
DELFIN E. ORT·EGA, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
PERRY A. T·HOMAS, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
Case 
No. 9709 
ST'ATE!JIENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
This is an action by plaintiff against defendant for 
injuries sust~ned in an.automobile accident July 12, 1960, 
at F·ifth West and North Temple Streets.~tn Salt ~ake 
City, Utah.· 
DI.SPOSITION IN T·HE LOWER -COURT. · 
Plaintiff was awarded judgment against defendant 
in the sum of $20,000.00 upon the verdict of a jury. The 
trial court denied defendant's motion for a new trial. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendant seeks a reversal of the trial court's order 
denying a new trial. 
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PRINCIPAL QUESTION PRESENTED 
!:fay a trial court properly give a "formula" instruc-
tion concerning negligence of the defendant whi0h does 
not truke into account the element of contributory negli-
gence of the plaintiff when that issue is rightly raised 
by the pleadings and the evidencef 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On the morning of July 12, 1960, Perry A. Thomas 
and his brother Larry Neil Thomas were returning from 
a navy leave at their home in Englewood, Colorado, to 
their ship the U. S. S. Midway, at anchor in Alameda, 
California (T. 435,481). Delbe·rt Schuller, a shipmate, who 
had accompanied Perry and Larry Thomas on leave at 
the1ir home was a passenger (T. 481). Defendant Perry 
A. Thomas was driving a 1952 F'ord sedan which was 
pulling a 2 wheel 7' x 10' trailer ( T'. 437). Two motor-
cycles were secured in the trailer ( T. 437). 
Defendant and his traveling companions entered 
Salt Lake City via 2nd West Street (T. 438). The sema-
phore at the intersection of 2nd West and North Temple 
was green ( T. 439). ..A .. fter slowing his vehicle he com-
pleted a right turn and proceeded west on North Temple 
Street. He slowed for a red light at the intersection of 
3rd West and North Temple to approximately 8 mph. 
and then proceeded as the light changed to green (T. 440). 
As he crested the viaduct between Third and Fifth West, 
traveling approximately 20-25 mph. (T. 441), he observed 
the semaphore light on Fifth West to be red ( T. 442). He 
decreased his speed and when approximately 75 feet from 
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t lw intersection the light changed to green and he con-
tinued in to the intersection ( T. 443, 445). ~1r. Thomas 
observed the Ortega automobile just before he entered 
the intersection from the west and applied his brakes 
but was unable to avoid a collision (T. 345-346). The front 
of the Thomas vehic.le collided with the left rear of the 
Ortega automobile. 
There was physical evidence that defendant Thomas 
had attempted to avoid the accident because skid marks 
were in evidence (T. 108-112). The evidence· is conflict-
ing as to which party had the right of way. The defend-
ant told investigating officer, Oscar J. Henriksen, fol-
lowing the accident, that he had entered on the green 
light ( T. 156). Witness Peggy Lynn Day indicated the 
light was not green for Thomas (T. 182-193), and wit-
ness Joe E. Archibeque, who was following the Ortega 
automobile testified that the semaphore light changed 
from green to red at the moment of impact (T·. 208). A 
witness and friend of the plaintiff, Robert Garcia, indi-
cated that he could see the traffic light was green for 
north and south bound traffic and red for east and west 
bound traffic, when the impact occurred (T. 249, 260). He 
later retracted his testimony concerning his ability to 
see the color of the light in both directions (T. 405). Of 
course, the plaintiff testified that a green light gave him 
the right of way in the intersection. 
Perry Thomas observed the semaphore light turn 
green when he was approximately 75 feet north of the 
intersection (T. 443). Larry Niel Thomas indicated that 
although he did not observe the light prior to entering 
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the intersection, that it was green in favor of Thorna8 
immediately following the accident (T. 483). 
In any event, a conflict of testimony was presented 
as to which party was entitled to the right of way through 
the intersecion. There was also evidence that Ortega had 
ample time to bring his automobile to a stop or otherwise 
avoid the accident. (T. 445-447). 
As a result of the accident the plaintiff Ortega suf-
fered bodily injury. 
STATEMENT OF POINT'S 
POINT I. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN SUBMITTING TO THE 
JURY FOR CONSIDERATION A VERDICT-DIRECTING 
(FORMULA) INSTRUCTION WHICH DID NOT TAKE INTO 
ACCOUNT CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE OF PLAINTIFF. 
POINT II. 
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL ER-
ROR IN DECLARING TO THE JURY THAT A POLICE OF-
FICER WAS AN EXPERT WITNESS. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN SUBMITTING TO THE 
JURY FOR CONSIDERATION A VERDICT-DIRECTING 
(FORMULA) INSTRUCTION WHICH DID NOT TAKE INTO 
ACCOUNT CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE OF PLAINTIFF. 
The Court's instruction No. 12 is a formula instruc-
tion apparently based on Instruction No. 2.4, Jury In-
struction Forms of Utah. The instruction as given is as 
follows: 
"INSTRUCTION NO. 12 
"Before you can return the verdict for the 
plaintiff you must find by a preponderance of 
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the evidence that each of the following two propo-
sitions is true: 
''Proposition No. 1: That the defendant was 
negligent in the operation of his automobile be-
fore the impact in one or more of the following 
particulars : 
"(a) In driving too fast for existing condi-
tions, or, 
"(b) In failing to keep a proper lookout for 
other vehicles, or 
" (c) In failing to yield right-of-way, or 
" (d) In failing to keep his vehicle under 
proper control. 
''Proposition No.2: That the said negligence 
of the defendant, if any, was the proximate cause 
of the occurrence. 
''If you find that the two foregoing proposi-
tions are true, you should determine the damages 
sustained by the plaintiff according to the instruc-
tions hereinafter given to you on that subject." 
The instruction does not incorporate within its pro-
visions the issue of contributory negligence. It directs 
the jury to return a verdict for the plaintiff simply upon 
proof of defendant's negligence and proximate cause. 
The instruction is in conflict with the court's instruction 
No. 14 relating to contributory negligence, which is as 
follows: 
"INSTRUCTION NO. 14. 
"Contributory negligence is negligence on the 
part of a person injured, which, co-operating with 
the negligence of another, assists in proximately 
causing his own injury. 
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"One who is guilty of contributory negligence 
may not recover from another for any injury 
suffered, because, if both parties were at fault in 
negligently causing an injury, the degree of negli-
gence cannot be weighed by the jury.'' 
Instruction No. 12, when read with Instruction No. 
14, has the effect of being confusing and misleading. 
It is fundamental that an instruction must include 
all of the conditions of recovery. The formula instruction 
given was intended for use in personal injury cases when 
contributory negligence is not an issue. The note follow-
ing this instruction, Jury Instruction Forms, Utah, 13, 
specifically limits its use as indicated: 
''If contributory negligence is in issue, use 
this instruction with Instruction No. 2.5." 
Instruction 2.5 includes as part of the same instruction 
the elements of contributory negligence. The same limita-
tions are contained in the California forms after which 
the Utah instructions were modeled. (See BAJI forms 
112.1, 113, pp. 287' 288). 
The pleadings and the pretrial order leave no doubt 
that contributory negligence was an issue in the case. 
The defendant had charged four separate grounds of 
contributory negligence, which consisted of : ( 1) failure 
to keep a proper lookout, (2) failure to ik:eep his car under 
proper control, (3) failure to yield the right-of-way by 
enterring the intersection against a red light, and ( 4) trav-
e1ing too fast for existing conditions (R. 7). Testimony 
supporting each of these claims of contributory negli-
gence was introduced by the defendant. 
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Giving of a ~imilar fonnula instruction was held 
t•rror in !vie v. Richardson, 9 Utah 2d 5, 11, 336 P.2d 781, 
for the following reasons: 
"The court gave this Instruction No. 4: 
''If you find from a preponderance of the 
evidence that the defendant failed to keep and 
maintain a proper lookout for the plaintiff in the 
driveway where the accident occurred and that 
such failure proximately resulted in the accident, 
then your verdict must be in favor of the plain-
tiff and against the defendant.' 
"The above instruction, taken by itself, is in 
error because it fails to take into account the pos-
sible contributory negligence of the plaintiff. This 
kind of instruction, sometimes referred to as a 
'formula' instruction, which makes a recital in 
accordance with the contention of a party and 
ends with the conclusion:'* **and if you so find, 
then your verdict must be for (the party) ' is not 
generally a good type of instruction to give. This 
is so because it lends itself to the error just noted 
and also because it tends to be argumentative 
rather than to set out the principles of law ap-
plicable to the issues impartially as to both par-
ties. For such reasons it is better to avoid giving 
instructions of that type. It is conceded that the 
issue of contributory negligence was properly cov-
ered in the next instruction. This, however, pitted 
one instruction against the other and might have 
been confusing to the jury.'" 
The Missouri court in Reari.ck vs. Manzella, 355 S.W. 
2d 13±, 136 (~Jo.), used similar language in reversing a 
jury award which was based upon a formula instruc-
tion: 
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"It is here contended by defendant that the 
trial court erred in giving plaintiff's verdict-di-
recting Instruction No. 1 because it failed to refer 
to or negative plaintiff's contributory negligence 
submitted as a defense in defendant's Instruction 
No. 7, 'there·by creating a conflict between the two 
instructions'. In view of present controlling deci-
sions it is our manifest duty to sustain the con-
tention.'' 
A later instruction directing the jury to consider all in-
structions together was held insufficient to correct the 
error. 
The Supreme Court of New J\iexico similarly ob-
served in McFatrvdge vs. Harlem Globe Trotters, 362 
P.2d 918: 
"There are innumerable cases holding that a 
'formula' instruction must include each and every 
element requisite to support a verdict, and that 
omission of any of these elements can not be sup-
plied by. reference to other instructions correctly 
stating the law.'' 
See also Whaley vs. Crutchfield, 294 S.W. 2d 775 
(Ark.). 
In Beyerle v. Clift, (Calif.) 209 Pac. 1015, the Cali-
fornia court reversed a judgment because a formula in-
struction did not include all conditions of recovery. 
''The errors relied upon consist in the giving 
of two instructions to the jury. In each of these 
instructions the court stated certain provisions 
of law defining the duties imposed upon an oper-
ator of .a vehicle, and then said: 
" 'If, therefore, you believe that the defendant 
violated any of the provisions of the law above 
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mentioned at the time of the accident complained 
of in this case, and that such violation was the 
proximate cause of the accident, you should find 
for the plaintiff.' 
"Assuming that the issue of contributory 
negligence was properly before the court, there 
is no doubt that these were erroneous instruc-
tions, because it is settled law that, if an instruc-
tion by its terms purports to state the conditions 
necessary to a verdict, it must state all those con-
ditions and must not overloo!k pleaded defenses 
on which substantial evidence has been intro-
duced. 
'''The court gave other instructions on the 
subject of contributory negligence, the correctness 
of which is not challenged. But this is not suf-
ficient to overcome the prejudicial character of 
the erroneous instructions. 
" '* • • But the giving of these other instruc-
tions simply produced a clear conflict in the in-
structions given the jury by the court, and it is 
impossible for us to say which instruction the 
jury followed in arriving at a verdict in favor of 
plaintiff.' Pierce v. United Gas & Elc. Co., supra, 
161 Cal .at page 185, 118 Pac. at page 704." 
Giving conflicting instructions or giving general in-
structions without regard to defendant's theory of de-
fense was held to be reversible error in Morris on v. 
Perry, 104 Utah 151, 140 P.2d 772. 
This Court has held that error arising from conflict-
ing instructions is prejudicial and is not cured by other 
correct instructions, because there is doubt whether the 
jury followed the proper instruction or the rmproper 
one. Sorensen v. B,ell, 51 Utah 262, 170 P. 72. 
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Morgan v. Bingham Stage Lines, 75 Utah 87, 283 
Pac. 160 was reversed for a new trial for failure to in-
struct the jury in defendant's theory of contributory 
negligence. 
"A party is entitled to have his case sub-
mitted to the jury on the theory of his evidence 
as well as upon the theory of the whole evidence. 
Toone v. 0 'Neill Canst. Co., 40 Utah 265, 121 
P. 10, Hartley v. Salt Lake City, 41 Utah 121, 124 
P. 522, 523 and Miller v. Utah Consol. M. Co., et 
al., 53 Utah 366, 178 P. 771; Pratt v. Utah Light 
& Traction Co., 57 Utah 7, 169 P. 868. 
"The following language of Mr. Justice 
STRAUP in the case of H(J)rtley v. Salt Lake City, 
supra, is peculiarly applicable here : 
"'·There are two parties to a lawsuit. Each 
on a submission of the case to the jury, is en-
titled to a submission of it on his theory and the 
law in respect thereof. The defendant's theory 
as to the cause of the accident is embodied in the-
proposed requests. There is some evidence, as we 
have shown, to render them applicable to the 
case. That is not disputed. We think the court's 
refusal to charge substantially as requested was 
error. That the ruling was prejudicial and works 
a reversal of the judgment is self-evident and 
unavoidable.' '' 
See also Beckstrom v. Will~ams, 3 Utah 2d 210, 282 
P.2d 309. 
The failure of the court to properly instruct the jury 
on the question or contributory negligence in connection 
with Instruction No 12 had the effect of failing to submit 
the case to the jury on defendant's theory of the case. 
10 
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Sorensen vs. Bell, 51 Utah 262, 265, 266 170 P. 72, 
reveals that the error which caused the Court to grant a 
new trial was committed by giving a form instruction 
very similar to Instruction No. 12, in the present case. 
The condemned instruction read as follows : 
"Unless you find from a preponderance of 
the evidence that the alleged negligence of the 
defendant actually existed and was the sole· prox-
imate cause of the injury of the deceased, and 
that the deceased, Hans Sorenson, was free from 
any negligence or want of reasonable care proxi-
mately contributing to the injury, plaintiff is not 
entitled to recover, and your verdict should be for 
the defendant." 
The instruction charged the jury that in order to 
find for the plaintiff it must rind from a preponderance 
of the evidence that the defendant was negligent as al-
leged and such negligence was the sole proximate cause 
of the injury, and that the deceased wa.s free from any 
negligence or want of reasonable care proximately con-
tributing to the injury. While the court observed that as 
an abstract proposition of law the statement just quoted 
1nay be correct, the language contained in the instruction 
in effect charged the jury that "unless it appear from a 
preponderance of the evidence . . . that the deceased 
was free from any negligence or want of reasonable care'' 
the plaintiff could not recover. The court held that the 
only: 
" ... fair, natural, obvious and ordinary 
meaning of the language contained in the fore-
going instruction is that the jury were required 
to find from a preponderance of the evidence that 
11 
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the deceased was free from negligence, etc. ; and, 
unless they so found, plaintiffs could not recover." 
The court then reversed the decision in this language·: 
''True, counsel point to other portions of the 
charge wherein, they contend, the rule respecting 
the burden of proof is correctly stated. If that 
be conceded, it does not minimize, much less cure, 
the palpable error contained in the foregoing in-
struction. At most, it would merely present a case 
where two instructions were given upon the same 
subject, one proper and the other improper. 
Where such is the case, the evidence is conflicting 
upon the subject covered by the instructions, or 
if such that more than one conclusion is permis-
sible, and the record leaves it in doubt whether the 
jury followed the instruction that is proper or the 
one that is improper, then but one result is legally 
permissible in this court, and that is to reverse 
the judgment and grant a new trial to the ag-
grieved party . . . ·The instruction is therefore 
clearly erroneous." 
The Sorenson case, is an earlier and equally clear 
statement supporting !vie v. Richardson, 9 Utah 2d5, 336 
P.2d 781. An instruction which does not contain all 
of the elements dealing with the particular proposition 
under instruction, or is susceptible to more than one 
conclusion, constitutes reversible error. Even though fol-
lowing instructions may properly define the issue in 
question, such does not remedy the defect. The error 
results from pitting one instruction against another, 
which may confuse the jury. 
In the instant case Instruction 12 was not only con-
fusing but was in direct conflict with later instructions. 
12 
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\Vere the jury to follow one, it must of necessity ignore 
another. The offending instruction in the instant case 
violates the clear statement of Morrison v. Perry, 104 
Utah 151, 140 P .2d 772, because the instruction as given, 
did not "aJid the jury'' but could only mislead and con-
fuse it." 
In the case of Jensen v. Utah Railway Company, 72 
Utah 366, 386, 270 P. 349, the Supreme Court condemned 
the use of "formula" instructions which tend to apply 
more general principles of law to a case without relating 
them to the facts. 
" The rule is well settled that , in instructing 
a jury, a mere abstract or general statement as 
to the law should be avoided, and that all instruc-
tions should be applicable to evidence on either 
one or the other of the respective theories of the 
partie-s. Instructions which are not so applicable, 
though abstractly they may be correct, are not 
helpful to the jury, are apt to be misleading and 
to be improperly applied. That a proposition may 
be correct in a sense, and yet inapplicable to the 
evidence or to the issue, is readily perceived.'' 
Complaint is not made _concerning the court's fail-
ure to substantially cover defendant's theory, but in fail-
ing to accurately instruct the jury concerning the inter-
relation of negligence and contributory negligence. The 
mere fact that a later instruction mentioned the theory 
is insufficient to correct that error: 
"It is conceded that the issue ofcontributory 
negligence was properly.covered in the next in-
struction. This, however, pitted one instruction 
13 
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against the other and might have been confusing 
to the jury." Ivie v. R~cha~dson, 9 Utah 2d 5, 336 
P.2d 781. 
Clark v. Los Angeles-Salt Lake Railway Company, 
73 Utah 486, 502, 508, 275 P. 582, declares the law with 
reference to the type of error which must be committed 
before a reversal will be granted. 
"All committed errors, of course, are not pre-
sumpt!vely prejudicial, but, when the error is of 
such nature or character as calculate,d to do harm, 
prejudice will be presumed unt.il by the record iJt 
is affirmatively shown that the error was not nor 
could have been of harmful effect. Jensen v. Utah 
Railway Company. 72 Utah 366, 270 P. 349." (Em-
phasis added.) 
Obviously, all of the theories of the case cannot be 
stated in one instruction and instructions which explain 
a particular instruction are proper. In the rinstant case 
the "natural and obvious meaning" of Instruction 12 
could only lead to conflict and confusion with Instruction 
14 dealing with contributory negligence, because they 
were antagonistic to each other. To believe one was to 
reject another. Thus, an irreconcilable conflict was pre-
sented to the jury. 
A formula instruction as given in this case has been 
condemned by this Court because it tends to pit one 
instruction against another. That very thing occurred 
in this case. The jury, after deliberating for some nine 
hours, returned to the court to seek clarification of in-
structions Number 12 and 14. They could not reconcile 
'14 
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tlH'm. To have followed either instruction would have 
been to disregard the other. The court then instructed 
them as follows : 
"The instructions you asked about do set out 
the law applicable to the opposite theories of 
each party. You should follow the instruction 
which you think is supported by a preponderance 
of the evidence.'' 
While the court inforn1ed the jury that each instruc-
tion set out the theory of the two parties, it did nothing 
to clarify or to reconcile the obvious antagonism between 
the two instructions. The jury was still faced with the 
proposition of accepting one~ and rejecting the, other. 
Had the instruction been properly given and contributory 
negligence set forth as a part of Instruction 12, the jury 
could have found that the defendant was negligent hut 
the plaintiff was precluded from recovery by reason of 
his contributory negligence. In following Instruction 12, 
as the jury undoubtedly did in returning the verdict, it 
was only necessary for them to find that the defendant 
was negligent without considering whe~ther or not plain-
tiff's own negligence proxin1ately contributed to his own 
injury. The so-called "clarifying instruction" did not 
clarify. The irreconcilable conflict between the two in-
structions remained with resulting prejudicial confusion. 
The jury was only plunged deeper into the knotty prob-
lem. 
When an instruction is prejudicially erroneous on 
its face a new trial is in order because the jury is pre-
sumed to follow the instructions of the court. The Su-
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preme Court in the case of Ry,an v. Beav.er County 82 
Utah 27, 31, 21 P .2d 858, stated : 
"The jury is bound, on questions of law, to 
yield full obedience to the instructions of the 
~ourt, and this applies as well to that part of the 
charge defining the issues, as made by the plead-
ings, as to the law declared by the court, and made 
appl~cable to the evidence as submitted.'' 
The following language of Mr. Justice Straup is 
taken from the case of Jensen v. Ut,ah Railway Company, 
72 Utah 366, 400, 270 P. 349, 362: 
''However, where the committed error is of 
such nature of character as calculated to do hann, 
or on its face as having the natural tendency to 
do so, prejudice will be presumed, until by the 
record it is affirmatively shown that the error 
was not or could not have been of harmful effect. 
Thus, if the appellant shows committed error of 
such nature or character, he, in the first instance, 
has made a prima facie showing of prejudice. 
The burden, or rather the duty of going forward, 
is then cast on the respondent to show by the 
record that the committed error was not, or could 
not have been, of harmful effect." (Citing cases.) 
Defendant has shown that the error complained of 
was "calculated to do harm" and has established a prima 
facie case of prejudice. He is entitled to new trial. 
POINT II. 
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL ER-
ROR IN DECLARING TO THE JURY THAT A POLICE OFFI-
CER WAS AN EXPERT WITNESS. 
During the course of the trial plaintiff produced as 
a witness Police Officer and parttime student, Carl J. 
16 
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Nemelka (T. 101). Plaintiff's counsel put to him a series 
of difficult questions in an attempt to interpret certa:in 
skid marks and "veer marks", which appeared at the 
scene. Defendant's attorney objected to the relevancy and 
materiality of a particular qeustion with reference to 
this subject and the following discussion occurred: 
"MR. HANSON: Your Honor, I'm go~ng to 
object to all this as being irrelevant, immaterial 
and not based on any evidence in this case at all. 
Certainly we are just speculating on things whiCh 
have no connection on what was found out here at 
this accident. 
"THE COURT: The Court does believe that 
this officer is an expert in his own sphere and I 
have allowed him to testify as to the solid brake 
marks prior to the change in direction. Mter that 
point I don't believe this officer is trained to eval-
uate the evidence as he found it. He may testify 
as to- I don't th~nk he's able to evalua.te it other 
than a layman. (Emphasi~ added.) 
"MR. KING: I wouldlike to- I differ with 
the Court, of course, and I- would like to pursue 
this to see whether he can or cannot apply the 
same tables. 
''MR. HANSON: Your Honor, may we ap-
proach the bench here for just a moment. 
"THE COURT : There is a law question come 
up, gentlemen of the jury, that we have to discuss 
out of the presence of the jury, so we will take 
the afternoon recess at this time. Again_the Court 
must admonish you not to discuss this- with any-
body else nor to form any opinions a_s to the final 
disposition of this case or any part thereof. 
17 
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"This Court will be in recess for ten minutes. 
" (Short recess.) 
"DISCUSSION IN CHAMBERS'' 
'MR. HANSON: The defendant ecxepts to 
the Court's statement to the jury that the Court 
does believe that this off~cer is an expert in his 
field, and with emphasis on the words 'does be-
lieve,' upon the ground and for the reason that it 
in effect amounts to a comment on the officer's 
credibility as a witness and also in effect amounts 
to a comment on the evidence. That is, that the 
Court told the jury that he felt that the officer 
was an expert and that they should inferentially 
give weigh to his testimony as an expert because 
the Court felt he was one. 
"MR. KING: Plaintiff responds to Defend-
ant's exception by suggesting that the Court, 
when the jury is recalled make a comment to the 
jury that the Court was intending to discuss the 
qualifications of Officer N emelka to go forward 
and was not in any way intending to comment on 
his qualifications in regard to what he has already 
testified to nor attempting to comment on the 
weight of the evidence. This I think would cure 
any possible error just as a motion to strike, cure 
possible error. 
"MR. HANSON: Well, the Defendant ob-
jects to that suggestion upon the grounds that 
that isn't what the Court intended to say or did 
say at all. The court was commenting on the 
weight to be given this man as an expert on things 
he had already testified about. 
"THE COURT: The Court didn't intend his 
remarks to have that connotation, to have that 
meaning or connotation to the jury. 
"MR. HANSON: I don't question that. I'm 
just thinking about the effect on this jury. 
18 
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"T liE COFH'r: YP:-;, but I think the Court at 
this time could tell the jury that the Court was 
ruling on the objection of Counsel as to allowing 
this officer to go forward with his testimony in 
connection with the· veer marks, and the Court 
made the comment he did concerning him being 
an expert up to a certain point; that the Court 
did not intend that his testimony should be given 
the weight of an expert or any way particularly, 
but the Court did not intend any remark to indi-
cate to the jury whether or not tbis-
"1\fR. HANSON: I couldn't object to that. 
I don't :know whether it cures it or not, but I cer-
tainly couldn't object to it. I object to the conno-
tation he has that you were talking about some-
thing he was going to say in fue future. You didn't 
mean that at all. That was just Mr. King's idea. 
That's not yours. 
"THE COURT: I'll just ten them then the 
remarks made in connection with the ruling of 
this past objection as to his competency to testify 
as to the veer marks, the Court did not intend 
anything at that time to infer that the jury should 
give any particular weight to this man's testi-
mony, that it should he believed or not believed. 
"!1:R. KING: Is that satisfactory, Mr. Han-
son~ 
"MR. HANSON: No, I'll reserve my objec-
tion. 
"THE CO"LTRT·: Sure. 
AFT'ER RECESS 
"(All parties present, the jury reseated in 
the box, and the following proceedings were had:) 
''THE COURT : Before proceeding with the 
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testimony of this witness, the Court wants to ad-
vise the jury that a moment ago when the Court 
was ruling on the objection of Mr. Hanson as to 
the testimony of this witness with respect to the 
physical factors occurring after the so-called veer-
ing of the wheel or brake marks started, the 
Court in referring to the testimony previously 
given by this witness and by referring to the wit-
ness as an expert did not in any way intend to 
indicate to the jury what weight they would or 
s!hould not or should devote or rely upon the 
evidence of this witness. You may proceed." ('T. 
133-136). 
It is the contention of the defendant that the remarks 
by the trial judge, wherein he stated that "the Court 
does believe tha~ this officer is an expert" is violative 
of Rule 51, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. T!hat rule 
precludes the court from commenting on the evidence 
in the case. The rule merely reaffirms the common law 
rul~ that a presiding judge at the trial of an action, may 
not express or indicate, directly or indirectly, to the jury 
or in their presence and hearing, any opinion as to the 
credibility of the witness or of fhe evidence. 88 C.J.S. 
Section 50 Sub. (c). 
The annotator in 53 Am. Jur., Trial, Section 82, 
sums up the law on this point as follows: 
''The trial· judge should be careful not to ex-
press or intimate his opinion as to the credibility 
of a witness; the jury are the sole judges of the 
credibility of witnesses, and any comment by the 
judge of this kind is evasive of their province." 
This court has long observed this rule. In the case 
of Hawley vs. Corey, 9 Utah 175, 33 P. 695, reversible 
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error was found to exist where the trial court intimated 
to the jury the weight of evidence which was to be given 
particular testimony. The prohibition was to run against 
evE-n impliedly intimating what the court's opinion may 
be upon the facts. 
The trial judge in stating his belief to the jury that 
the plaintiff was an expert had the effect of commenting 
upon the evidence. He stated without qualification his 
opinion as to the credibility of the witness. This, of 
course, would have the effect of advising the jury that 
they were to give great importance to his testimony, and 
was violative of this well recognized rule, State vs. 
Green 78 Utah 580, 6 P.2d 177. The remark had the fur-
ther effect of emphasizing a part of the evidence, which 
also is prohibited. J enk~ns vs. Stephens, 64 Utah 307, 
231 P. 112. See also, State vs. Harris, 1 Utah 2d 182, 
264 P.2d 284. 
A.D. exception to the statement of the court was time-
ly made. The court then attempted to correct any mis-
impression that may have occurred as a result of the 
comment. However, the defendant's exception to the 
original remark remained and the statement of the judge 
resulted in no more than emphasizing the error that had 
been committed. 
As previously observed in the case of Clark vs. Los 
.Angeles-Salt Lake Ra-ilway Company, 73 Utah 486, 275 
P. 582, when an error is committed by the court, and is 
of such character as ''calculated to harm, prejudice will 
be presumed until by the record it is affirmatively shown 
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that the error was not nor could have been a harmful 
effect.'' 
It is submitted in the instant case that when the 
prestige of a police officer is added to that of the court's 
comment, that the officer was an expert, such is of a 
nature "calculated to do harm". The defendant's rights 
were substantially prejudiced by reason of such com-
ment and is a sufficient basis for declaring a mistrial. 
CONCLUSION 
The defendant suffered material prejudice because 
the court submitted to the jury for consideration a for-
mula instrution which authorized recovery for defend-
ant's negligence without taking into account the 
contributory negligence of plaintiff. This error was com-
pounded by the court improperly commenting on the 
evidence in stating to the jury his belief that a police. 
officer, one of plaintiff's witnesses, was an expert. 
Respectfully submitted, 
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